Is there a Supervenience problem for robust moral realism?

Is there a Supervenience problem for robust moral realism?

They have no explanation. As Blackburn (1971) put it, supervenience is “an opaque, isolated logical fact, for which no explanation can be proffered.” It’s not a refutation; it was never meant to be. As McPherson (2012) says, the argument is supposed to pose an explanatory challenge to Robust Realism.

What is the Supervenience argument?

ABSTRACT. Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument” purports to show that epiphenomenalism about the mental follows from premises that any nonreductive physicalist should find acceptable. Kim regards his argument as a reductio ad absurdum of nonreductive physicalism.

Who came up with Physicalism?

Otto Neurath
Definition of physicalism. The word “physicalism” was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap.

How is moral disagreement a problem for realism?

Others beg the question against the moral realist, and yet others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that—when carefully stated—can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement. Arguments based on moral disagreement itself have almost no weight, I conclude, against moral realism.

How do you use Supervene in a sentence?

Supervene in a Sentence 🔉

  1. The train’s arrival will supervene because it had to stop for minor repairs therefore delaying its routine.
  2. Due to supervene of war, the soldiers’ usual life will soon be interrupted when they are deployed.

What is the best argument for physicalism?

The most promising such argument is the causal argument, which may be summarised thus: (i) mental properties have physical effects; (ii) physics is causally complete (all physical effects have physical causes); (iii) effects are not generally overdetermined; so (iv) mental properties are physical.

What is the knowledge argument against physicalism?

The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the doctrine that the world is entirely physical. Physicalism (also known as materialism) is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy. But some doubt that phenomenal consciousness—experience, the subjective aspect of the mind—is physical.

Is ethical supervenience a problem for the realist?

Given that Moore and Sidgwick were both ethical realists, it is perhaps striking that the most influential philosophical use of ethical supervenience has been in arguments against ethical realism. In his argument for error theory, J. L. Mackie briefly claims that supervenience makes trouble for the realist.

What is Blackburn’s argument against moral realism?

Though Blackburn speaks of ‘supervenience’ and ‘necessitation’ rather than weak and strong supervenience, his argument against moral realism rests on exactly the demand for explanation that we have been exploring.

Is ethical supervenience a conceptual truth?

Metaphysical Supervenience and Ethical Realism The Blackburn-inspired argument against ethical realism relies crucially on the assumption that ethical supervenience is a conceptual truth. For thesis (2) was crucial to that argument:

What are relevant supervening properties of ethics?

A survey of the literature provides a variety of suggestions: relevant supervening properties are characterized as ethical , moral, evaluative, or normative. The nature of each of these categories, and the relationship between them, are both controversial.